5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
justme a9f78f99df ci: version from the tag or the commits since it; dev images from main gated on tests; recognise -dev. tags [CI SKIP] 2026-10-09 13:20:30 +08:00
justme 904ea2b0ae refactor: remove the runtime binary binding; every release registration path verifies the CI signature [CI]
ci/woodpecker/push/main-amd64-build Pipeline was successful
The hash a node reports about itself cannot be trusted (a swapped binary can
copy the old hash), so the runtime binding only caught files that were replaced
by something that did not lie. Provenance stays where it can be verified: the
signed release manifest (digest) and the signed SHA256SUMS.

- Remove BinaryBindingService, the node_bindings table (schema v15 drops it),
  BinaryPolicy, the handshake hash/manifest fields and the admin binary column.
- Drop the per-platform "binaries" list from the release manifest, the hash
  scripts and the updater's installed.manifest copy.
- ReleaseService.PublishAsync now verifies the release signature, so the admin
  POST /releases route is no longer an unsigned path; tests sign with a test key.
- Docs: section 16 explains why the runtime check is gone.
2026-10-08 18:30:05 +08:00
justme 4841f7b15b feat: bind each node to the binary it runs at its first handshake; refuse changes that are not in a CI-signed manifest [CI]
ci/woodpecker/push/main-amd64-build Pipeline failed
2026-10-08 05:39:13 +08:00
justme a2f88a344b feat!: genesis-pinned operator set, server identity with an encrypted control link, key-less join codes; release key continuity
ci/woodpecker/tag/gitea-release Pipeline is pending
ci/woodpecker/tag/linux-release Pipeline failed
ci/woodpecker/tag/windows-release Pipeline was canceled
Join codes need no passkey touch and carry only public values (genesis
fingerprint, owner credentials, installer hashes). Nodes pin the genesis and
owners at enrollment and only follow passkey-signed operator set versions.
The panel's server key is listed in the set; pinned nodes require its
signature and run the control link under AES-256-GCM. Password sessions carry
no capabilities. The updater adopts a next_key from a signed manifest.

Bump version to 0.2.0. [CI SKIP]
2026-10-08 03:21:44 +08:00
justme 8dd3209a65 feat!: probes link to the panel; signed release updates for container nodes [CI]
Probes connect to the panel directly and get the agent list as desired state.
CI signs the image digest of agent and probe releases, the panel forwards the
manifest, and a host updater verifies it with a local public key, pulls by
digest and rolls back when the new version is unhealthy.
2026-10-06 22:42:12 +08:00