12 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
justme	904ea2b0ae	refactor: remove the runtime binary binding; every release registration path verifies the CI signature [CI] ... The hash a node reports about itself cannot be trusted (a swapped binary can copy the old hash), so the runtime binding only caught files that were replaced by something that did not lie. Provenance stays where it can be verified: the signed release manifest (digest) and the signed SHA256SUMS. - Remove BinaryBindingService, the node_bindings table (schema v15 drops it), BinaryPolicy, the handshake hash/manifest fields and the admin binary column. - Drop the per-platform "binaries" list from the release manifest, the hash scripts and the updater's installed.manifest copy. - ReleaseService.PublishAsync now verifies the release signature, so the admin POST /releases route is no longer an unsigned path; tests sign with a test key. - Docs: section 16 explains why the runtime check is gone.	2026-10-08 18:30:05 +08:00
justme	f22fdf8b68	feat: first-run claim wizard (no default admin, claim code from the backend log); owner list shows account and passkey; container install first [CI]	2026-10-08 06:47:10 +08:00
justme	2ae63653c4	feat: the node itself requires an owner passkey (shared by agent and probe) and reports it; the panel derives the account and passkey it is bound to [CI]	2026-10-08 06:15:07 +08:00
justme	8c37db1577	feat: every agent and probe must have an owner passkey, enforced by the panel, the installers and fleet-enroll [CI]	2026-10-08 06:04:04 +08:00
justme	4841f7b15b	feat: bind each node to the binary it runs at its first handshake; refuse changes that are not in a CI-signed manifest [CI]	2026-10-08 05:39:13 +08:00
justme	4106f831dc	feat!: drop the backend-side elevation windows; password and passkey sessions share capabilities, passkeys guard what nodes verify; the trust page lists added and removed passkeys [CI]	2026-10-08 04:57:28 +08:00
justme	a2f88a344b	feat!: genesis-pinned operator set, server identity with an encrypted control link, key-less join codes; release key continuity ... Join codes need no passkey touch and carry only public values (genesis fingerprint, owner credentials, installer hashes). Nodes pin the genesis and owners at enrollment and only follow passkey-signed operator set versions. The panel's server key is listed in the set; pinned nodes require its signature and run the control link under AES-256-GCM. Password sessions carry no capabilities. The updater adopts a next_key from a signed manifest. Bump version to 0.2.0. [CI SKIP]	2026-10-08 03:21:44 +08:00
justme	a19e6548d3	feat: trust forwarded client addresses only from configured proxies (rate limit, audit, SSE) [CI] ... Docs: access.md covers the missing node-side Backend identity and the hash-first install flow.	2026-10-07 22:51:44 +08:00
justme	ff45ad086e	feat!: sensitive actions need a fresh passkey touch (elevation windows), plus login page hint cleanup [CI]	2026-10-07 22:29:24 +08:00
justme	6385c1b9a3	feat: sign in with a passkey (WebAuthn, ES256, discoverable credentials) and manage your passkeys [CI]	2026-10-07 21:57:19 +08:00
justme	ddb6608e32	feat!: capabilities replace API token scopes; every admin endpoint declares one, with a picker UI [CI]	2026-10-07 20:56:36 +08:00
justme	55b80f0a97	docs: access control and enrollment trust chain design [CI SKIP]	2026-10-07 20:45:23 +08:00