The hash a node reports about itself cannot be trusted (a swapped binary can
copy the old hash), so the runtime binding only caught files that were replaced
by something that did not lie. Provenance stays where it can be verified: the
signed release manifest (digest) and the signed SHA256SUMS.
- Remove BinaryBindingService, the node_bindings table (schema v15 drops it),
BinaryPolicy, the handshake hash/manifest fields and the admin binary column.
- Drop the per-platform "binaries" list from the release manifest, the hash
scripts and the updater's installed.manifest copy.
- ReleaseService.PublishAsync now verifies the release signature, so the admin
POST /releases route is no longer an unsigned path; tests sign with a test key.
- Docs: section 16 explains why the runtime check is gone.
Join codes need no passkey touch and carry only public values (genesis
fingerprint, owner credentials, installer hashes). Nodes pin the genesis and
owners at enrollment and only follow passkey-signed operator set versions.
The panel's server key is listed in the set; pinned nodes require its
signature and run the control link under AES-256-GCM. Password sessions carry
no capabilities. The updater adopts a next_key from a signed manifest.
Bump version to 0.2.0. [CI SKIP]
The status helper runs as root with all capabilities dropped, so it could not write a volume owned by uid 1654 (mktemp: Permission denied) and the volume updater failed on rootful Podman. Add DAC_OVERRIDE only.
Namespaces, assemblies, solution, binaries, images, systemd units, config paths, environment variables, protocol methods and the Linux user are all renamed. Breaking: existing databases, node identities and installed units must be recreated.
Probes connect to the panel directly and get the agent list as desired state.
CI signs the image digest of agent and probe releases, the panel forwards the
manifest, and a host updater verifies it with a local public key, pulls by
digest and rolls back when the new version is unhealthy.
justme
geruipu